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Cognitive science and the
cultural challenge
Interdisciplinarity is highly valued these days in academia, and with good reason. Many
problems require the concepts, tools and insights of multiple disciplines for their
solutions. Furthermore, interdisciplinarity – done well – can help scholars break free
of old paradigms and make true innovations. It is thus both unfortunate and perplexing
that collaborations between psychology and anthropology are vanishingly rare. The
goal of Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge (Bloch 2012; hereafter, ‘ACC’) is
to change this state of affairs: to get anthropologists and psychologists talking to one
another; ‘to change the ground … where the different disciplines can meet and engage
in a joint, yet difficult enterprise’ (p. 192). Maurice Bloch is just the person to write this
important book, given his own seminal research in cognitive anthropology and his
interdisciplinary successes (e.g. Bloch et al. 2001). The result is a brilliant tour-de-force
that should be required reading for both anthropologists and psychologists.
One important contribution of ACC is the historical analysis explaining how we
have come to this impasse. Bloch argues that anthropologists have resisted cognitive
sciences in order to avoid (among other things) reductionism and genetic determinism.
This backdrop is crucial for reminding us of the potential pitfalls of an overly enthusi-
astic embracing of biological bases to social difference (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011),
and for underlining the implicit and unexamined assumptions that underlie distinct
research traditions. Most notable among them is the idea, casually embraced by
psychologists as well as anthropologists, that nature and culture are deeply opposed.
Yet as Bloch reminds us: ‘There are no non-cultural bits of us as there are no non-
natural bits. … [W]e are simultaneously created by our biology, which includes our
psychology, and by history and culture’ (pp. 76, 119). The implications of this point are
far-reaching. If history/psychology and biology/culture are inextricably intertwined, then
neither psychologists nor anthropologists can afford to simply ignore the other.
With the problem diagnosed, then, what is to be done?
Bloch documents that understanding any complex concept (such as time, or social
relationships, or ‘the self’, or memory) requires different levels of analyses, and
correspondingly, different approaches depending on one’s question. He further makes
a powerful case for the value of psychological concepts and methods in anthropological
research; readers who are cognitive psychologists will find themselves nodding along in
enthusiastic agreement. An example par excellence is the monograph by Astuti et al.
(2004), who disentangled, with surgical precision, the metacognitive beliefs of the Vezo
regarding property transfer in human groups from their unarticulated but foundational
essentialist beliefs. Another compelling example (from Regnier 2012; see also this
volume) illustrates how cognitive science models of essentialism shed light on marriage
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practices in Madagascar, where the descendants of free persons show opposition to mar-
rying the descendants of enslaved persons. This bias is evident even though slavery was
abolished inMadagascar in 1896 and the descendants of free and enslaved persons are em-
pirically indistinguishable. In this case, slavery is (implicitly) essentialised, which in turn
influences social practices more than 100 years later. Although much more work needs
to be done, we are encouraged by the recent contributions of other scholars as well, in-
cluding: Astuti and Harris (2008); Atran et al. (2005); Hirschfeld (1996); Keane (2015);
McIntosh (2009); Rogoff (2011); Taverna et al. (2012); Watson-Jones et al. (2014).
What these examples (and others) have in common is a combination of approaches
that might at first seem paradoxical: one the one hand, deep knowledge and apprecia-
tion of the culture and language of the group under study, and on the other hand,
concepts of individual psychological processes and controlled scientific methods. We
also underscore Bloch’s point that evidence regarding the cognitive development of
children holds particular value and promise. As Chomsky reminded us, any cognitive
theory must be compatible with the reality of how children learn. In Chomsky’s case,
this meant that linguistic theories of grammar had to square with the ‘learnability’
puzzle – that is, the fact that children acquire their native tongue, in much of its
spectacular complexity, by 3 or 4 years of age. In the case of culture, there is undoubt-
edly a parallel learnability puzzle. Yet precisely what this means is largely still
unknown, as we don’t yet have sufficient data regarding the representations and
behaviours of children from a variety of societies. We urge more serious attention to
developmental considerations, on both sides of the disciplinary divide.
Although Bloch (the anthropologist) eloquently argues for psychological approaches
to anthropology, we (two psychologists) would love to hear more about the value of an-
thropological approaches to cognitive sciences. This is a topic that the book largely sets to
the side, as the proper subject matter for another book (p. 1). This is unfortunate and
somewhat ironic, as there is now a sea-change in psychology, with a belated realisation
that claims about human cognition are typically drawn from overly narrow samples,
and are therefore not sensitive to human cognitive variation (Heinrich et al. 2010). This
is so not only with intuitively culture-dependent processes, such as adult ideas of reci-
procity, but even for seemingly ‘hard-wired’ processes, such as infant visual perception
(Bar-haim et al. 2006). We thus applaud Bloch for the extraordinary book he has written,
but end with a plea for a sequel, explaining the cultural challenge to cognitive scientists.
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